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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

volving the traditional classifications of realty or personalty, its
utility breaks down when it becomes necessary to consider a combined classification. If an individual owning his residential module
rents a space in which to place it, should he be treated as a tenant because he is renting a space, or should he be considered a fee
owner because he owns his "apartment"? Thus, the distinction
between real and personal interests as regarding damages in the
instant case becomes more and more difficult to apply. Rather than
merely focusing on the legal differences and similarities, the courts
should move away from relying on formalistic distinctions, and
focus instead on the practicalaspects of a given interest.
STANLEY W.

VALKOSKY, JR.

TORTS-SPECIFIC INTENT TO INDEMNIFY INDEMNITEE FOR
His ACTIVE NEGLIGENCE FOUND DESPITE EQUIVOCAL CONTRACT
LANGUAGE

In November, 1964, a Shell service station exploded seriously
injuring two employees. The explosion and ensuing fire were
caused by a defective heater located inside the station. Both Shell
Oil Company and Visconti, the tenant-operator of the station,
were aware of the defect but took no remedial action. The employees brought suit against Shell who in turn impleaded Visconti
on the basis of an indemnification clause contained in the service
station lease. The indemnification clause stated that Visconti would
indemnify Shell
against any and all claims, suits, loss, cost and liability on ac-

count of injury or death of persons or damage to property . . .
caused by or happening in connection with 'the premises . . .
or the condition maintenance, possession or use thereof or the
operations thereon.'

The trial court ruled for the plaintiffs in the principal action and
for Shell as third-party plaintiff in the indemnification action. 2
The appellate division affirmed the verdict in favor of the
employees but modified the judgment by dismissing Shell's third
1. Levine v. Shell Oil Co., 28 N.Y.2d 205, 210, 269 N.E.2d 799, 801, 521 N.Y.S.2d
81, 84 (1971) [hereinafter cited as instant case].
2. Id. at 206. 269 N.E.2d at 800, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
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party claim.3 The New York Court of Appeals, while affirming the
plaintiffs' judgment, reinstated the verdict in favor of Shell on the
third party action.4 Held, the indemnification clause between Shell
and Visconti was sufficiently explicit to entitle Shell to indemnification despite its own active negligence. Levine v. Shell Oil Co.,
28 N.Y.2d 205, 269 N.E.2d 799, 321 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1971).
It is a general rule that a lessee may be validly bound by a
contract providing indemnification for any future claims arising
as a result of his own active negligence or due to the passive
negligence of the lessor.' It is also well settled that a party who is
actively negligent is not entitled to indemnification in the absence
of an express agreement to that effect. 6 This agreement must clearly
show that the intent of the contracting parties, as manifested by
unequivocal language, is to grant indemnification despite the lessor's active negligence. 7 To ascertain the intentions of the parties
involved, courts have often examined the surrounding circumstances and the relationship of the parties. 8 In doing so, indemnification has been allowed for the indemnitee's9 active negligence
where this clearly appeared to be the purpose and objective of the
contracting individuals. °
In applying the above principles, New York courts in the
past have required specific reference to the indemnitee's active
Levine v. Shell Oil Co., 35 App. Div. 2d 575, 313 N.Y.S.2d 581 (2d Dep't 1970).
Instant case at 213, 269 N.E.2d at 803, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
See Schwartz v. Merola Bros. Constr. Corp., 290 N.Y. 145, 48 N.E.2d 299 (1943); 1
WARREN'S NEGLIGENCE, Indemnity & Contribution § 1.03 (R. Benoit ed. 1965).
6. Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164
N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957); Fuller Co. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 7 App. Div. 2d 33, 180
N.Y.S.2d 589 (1st Dep't 1958); Salamy v. N.Y. Cent. Sys., 1 App. Div. 2d 27, 146 N.Y.S.2d
814 (3d Dep't 1955) ; Ellis v. Fuller Co., 17 Misc. 2d 687, 182 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
7. Kurek v. Port Chester Housing Authority, 18 N.Y.2d 450, 223 N.E.2d 25, 276
N.Y.S.2d 612 (1966) ; Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d
895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957); Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 271 N.Y. 36, 2
N.E.2d 35 (1936).
8. Thibault v. New York, 6 App. Div. 2d 904, 177 N.Y.S.2d 905 (2d Dep't 1958),
aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 759, 159 N.E.2d 204, 186 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1959) ; Jordon v. City of New York,
3 App. Div. 2d 507, 162 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1st Dep't 1957), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 723, 152 N.E.2d 667,
177 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1958).
9. The indemnitor is the party contracting to compensate the indemnitee should a
specified event occur.
10. Kurek v. Port Chester Housing Authority, 18 N.Y.2d 450, 223 N.E.2d 25, 276
N.Y.S.2d 612 (1966); Thibault v. New York, 6 App. Div. 2d 904, 177 N.Y.S.2d 905 (2d
Dep't 1958), affd, 6 N.Y.2d 759, 159 N.E.2d 204, 186 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1959); Jordon v. City of
New York, 3 App. Div. 2d 507, 162 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1st Dep't 1957), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 723, 152
N.E.2d 667, 177 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1958).
3.
4.
5.
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negligence in order to hold the indemnitor liable." Accordingly,

they have refused to impose liability on a contractor for the active
negligence of the owner when the indemnitor agreed to "save
the owner harmless from any expense or liability resulting from
injury to persons ....12 Similarly, the phrase "any and all claims"
was held to be too general to encompass active negligence. 3
In the leading case of Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Otis Elevator
14
Co., the subcontractor agreed to indemnify the general contractor
"against all claims for damages to persons growing out of the exe.
cution of the work."'" Holding this language not sufficiently unequivocal, the Court of Appeals stated,
to say that . . .the appellant, by such general language as was
here used, assumed the obligation of indemnifying respondent
for claims resulting from accidents . . .caused by the negligence
of respondent .. . is to place upon appellant an unreasonable
burden ....16

This case became the leading example supporting the proposition
that "contracts will not be construed to indemnify a person against
his own [active] negligence unless such intention is expressed
in unequivocal terms.'

17

In recent years New York courts have to some extent relaxed
this specific language requirement. The clear intent to indemnify
the indemnitee for his own active negligence must, however, still
be evident.' In the case of Yonke v. CentralHudson Gas & Electric
Corp.,19 for example, the contractor agreed to save the owner harmless

11. Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 148 N.E.2d 895, 164
N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957); Fuller Co. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 7 App. Div. 2d 33, 180
N.Y.S.2d 589 (1st Dep't 1958).
12. Ellis v. Fuller Co., 17 Misc. 2d 687, 690, 182 N.Y.S.2d 594, 597 (Sup. Ct. 1959)
(emphasis added).
13. Rego v. City of New York, 285 App. Div. 834, 885, 137 N.Y.S.2d 5, 6 (2d Dep't
1955) (emphasis added).
14. 271 N.Y. 86, 2 N.E.2d 35 (1936).
15. Id. at 39,2 N.E.2d at 36 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 43, 2 N.E.2d at 38.
17. Id. at 41, 2 N.E.2d at 37.
18. Jordon v. City of New York, 3 App. Div. 2d 507, 162 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1st Dep't
1957), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 723, 152 N.E.2d 667, 177 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1958); Salamy v. N.Y. Cent.
Sys., 1 App. Div. 2d 27, 146 N.Y.S.2d 814 (3d Dep't 1955); Silia v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co.,
35 Misc. 2d 807, 231 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
19. 52 Misc. 2d 1039, 277 N.Y.S.2d 806 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd, 27 App. Div. 2d 888,
278 N.Y.S.2d 592 (3d Dep't 1967).
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from claims for damages for personal injury including death
to any employee or other person . . . which may arise . . . in
any manner from the carrying out of this Contract .... 20

Indemnification was granted despite the fact that the owner was
actively negligent and no express provision including active negligence was contained in the indemnity clause. The court concluded
that the phrase "in any manner" could reasonably be interpreted
to show the intention of the parties to grant indemnification for
active negligence on the part of the owner.2 1 Similarly, in Powell
v. Senville 35th St. Realty Co., 2 the court held that the owner of a
building under construction was entitled to indemnification, despite his active negligence. The indemnity clause therein stated
that the carpentry contractor would assume responsibility for
91any and all" damages or injuries "caused or occasioned directly
or indirectly by the Contractor or its work."' Again, no specific
mention was made in the contract of the indemnitee's active negligence, yet the indemnitor was held liable because the court reasoned that the clause was sufficiently explicit to indicate the intent of the parties to allow indemnification in such an event.
In holding Visconti liable under his lease, the Court of
Appeals, in the instant case, was required to determine whether
the trial court correctly applied the law of indemnification. The
court acknowledged that an actively negligent tortfeasor is not entitled to indemnification unless there exists a contractual agreement
manifesting such intent.24 Although recognizing that traditionally
such contracts have been strictly construed 5 and that courts have
frequently searched for specific mention of active negligence within
the indemnity clause, the court in the instant case maintained that
such references were unnecessary.26 The court further observed that
20. Id. at 1040, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 808 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 1041, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
22. 29 Misc. 2d 77, 214 N.Y.S.2d 39 (New York City Ct. 1961).
23. Id. at 79, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 41 (emphasis added).
24. Instant case at 211, 269 N.E.2d at 801, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
25. Kurek v. Port Chester Housing Authority, 18 N.Y.2d 450, 456, 223 N.E.2d 25,
27, 276 N.Y.S.2d 612, 615 (1966); Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 271 N.Y. 36,
37, 2 N.E.2d 35, 37 (1936).
26. Instant case at 211, 269 N.E.2d at 802, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 85. Several examples were
cited in which the intent of the parties was deemed to be sufficiently clear to justify the
granting of indemnification despite the fact that no specific mention of the indemnitee's
active negligence was made. Among the examples cited were Jordon v. City of New York,
5 N.Y.2d 723, 724, 152 N.E.2d 667, 177 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1958) (contractor agreed to "be
solely responsible for all physical injuries to persons or damage to property . . . whether
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the recent cases of Kurek v. Port Chester Housing AuthorityT and
Lift v. Consolidated Edison Co. 2 had made substantial inroads
upon the requirement of unequivocal contractual terms before the
active negligence of the indemnitee could be indemnified. This,
the court contended, was due to the liberal interpretations of
such requirements given by the Kurek and Lift courts.2" Indeed,
it was implied that the Kurek and Liff cases, in which indemnification for active negligence was granted, contained the least explicit indemnity clauses yet found in New York.30
It was further recognized that the indemnification clause in
the instant case was different from those in the Kurek and Liff
cases, since the phrases "of whatsoever kind or nature" and "or
otherwise" were present in the latter cases but not in the instant
case. However, the court considered this only a "semantical distinction without a difference." 31
The Court of Appeals was also concerned that contractual provisions should not be construed in such a manner as to render any
clause a nullity. The court asserted that if the indemnity clause
in the instant case were construed so as not to include liability
for active negligence of the indemnitee, the clause would be
meaningless. 2 Such, it was said, "could not have been the intent of
3
the parties.

'1

In addition, the court in a dictum stated that the agreement
was not a contract of adhesion 34 since Shell was not obligated to
lease the service station to Visconti, and Visconti was not obligated
to accept the lease if he disapproved of the terms."
such damages or injuries be attributable to negligence of the Contractor or his employees
or otherwise"); Walters v. Rao Elec. Co., 289 N.Y. 57, 60, 43 N.E.2d 810, 811 (1942)
(indemnity phrase read: "Should any person or persons or property be damaged or
injured by the Subcontractor, or by any person, or persons employed under him, in the
course of performance, by him of this agreement or otherwise, said Subcontractor shall
alone be liable, responsible and answerable therefore, and does hereby agree . . . to hold
harmless and indemnify the Contractor of and from all claims . .
27. 18 N.Y.2d 450, 223 N.E.2d 25, 276 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1966).
28. 29 App. Div. 2d 665, 286 N.Y.S.2d 354 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 23 N.Y.2d 854, 245
N.E.2d 800, 298 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1969).
29. Instant case at 212, 269 N.E.2d at 802, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 212-13, 269 N.E.2d at 803, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 86. It is not entirely clear from

the court's opinion why the clause would be of no value if not held to include active
negligence.
33. Id. at 213, 269 N.E.2d at 803, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
34. See text accompanying supra notes 61, 62.
35. Instant case at 213, 269 N.E.2d at 803, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 86-87.
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In analyzing the holding of the instant case it is necessary
to examine the cases reviewed by the court. The Thompson-Starrett case was dismissed with the statement that "it is no longer
a viable statement of the law."36 As stated previously, that case
stood for the proposition that an actively negligent indemnitee is
not entitled to indemnification in the absence of a contract containing unequivocal terms manifesting such intent." The court agreed
with prior cases holding that unequivocal words are no longer required for indemnification to be awarded to an actively negligent
indemnitee. Nevertheless, the fact remains that such must be
clearly shown to have been the intent of the parties. 8 In light of
this, it is difficult to understand why the court gave such little
weight to Marks v. New York City Transit Authority. 9 Instead of
comparing the contract in Marks to that in Levine with respect to
intent, the court merely listed Marks as one of five cases supporting the proposition that courts have often searched for specific reference to active negligence. 4° In Marks, a painting contractor's employee was injured while on the job. It was found that the Authority was negligent in failing to provide a safe place to work. The indemnity agreement stated that the contractor would "be solely
responsible for all injuries . . .and ... [t]he liability of the Contractor under this paragraph is absolute. . . . "41 There it was held
that the Authority was not entitled to indemnification because the
above quoted phrase fell "short of manifesting a clear and unequivocal intent to protect the Authority against the consequences of its own negligence." ' Visconti asserted that the indemnification clause in Marks was clearly more explicit in demonstrating an unmistakable intent than the clause found in the
instant case. Thus, since Marks held the clause inadequate and
denied indemnification Visconti argued that it should also be
36. Id. at 212, 269 N.E.2d at 802, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
37. Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 271 N.Y. 36, 41, 2 N.E.2d 35, 37
(1936). See supranotes 14-17 and accompanying text.
38. See cases cited in supra note 18, and text accompanying supra notes 19-23.
39. 17 Misc. 2d 583, 187 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1959), rev'd, 11 App. Div. 2d 993,
205 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Ist Dep't 1960), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 620, 191 N.E.2d 91, 240 N.Y.S.2d 606
(1963).
40. Instant case at 211, 269 N.E.2d at 802, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
41. Court of Appeals brief for Third-Party Defendant-Respondent New York City
Transit Authority at 4.
42. Marks v. New York City Transit Authority, 11 App. Div. 2d 993, 994, 205
N.Y-S.9d 642, 645 (Ist Dep't 1960).
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denied in the case at bar.43 A comparison of the indemnity clauses
lends support to Visconti's contention.
The court may have also inaccurately applied the Kurek and
Liff cases. In Kurek, the indemnification clause stated that the
indemnitor would indemnify the Authority for "all claims ... of
whatsoever kind or nature . . . ."44 On the basis of this phrase,
indemnification was granted. Kurek was cited in the instant case
to support the proposition that inroads had been made on the
Thompson-Starrett doctrine. The argument that less explicit language is sometimes held to be sufficient to require indemnification,
however, misses the point. What is essential is that it must be evident that such was the unmistakable intent of the contracting parties. The phrase "of whatsoever kind or nature" gave an allencompassing scope to the indemnity clause. Hence the court concluded that the phrase illustrated a clear intent to include active
negligence on the part of the indemnitee as one of the elements to
be covered by the indemnitee's agreement. It is apparent that although the Kurek case was used by the court to demonstrate a
liberalization of the unequivocal language requirement, it really
was not opposed to Visconti's position. The Kurek clause, with an
all-inclusive phrase, manifested the intent of the parties to include
the active negligence of the indemnitee under the indemnity
agreement. Although the case at bar contained no such all-inclusive phrase, the Court of Appeals held that the intent of the parties to grant indemnification despite'4 active negligence on the indemnitee's part was "unmistakable.

,

The Liff case, a very recent Court of Appeals decision, was
also relied upon in the instant case. The relevant clause in that
case read:
The Contractor shall indemnify . . . the Company from
and against any and all liability . . . occasioned wholly or in
part by . . . the Contractor . . . including any and all expense,
legal or otherwise .... 46

This clause was determined to be sufficient to justify an indemnity
award. The Liff case can be distinguished from the instant case
43. Brief for Defendant-Respondent at 7, instant case.
44. Kurek v. Port Chester Housing Authority, 18 N.Y.2d 450, 456, 223 N.E.2d 25,
28, 276 N.Y.S.2d 612, 615 (1966) (emphasis added).
45. Instant case at 212, 269 N.E.2d at 802, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
46. Court of Appeals brief for Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent Consolidated Edison
at 13.
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by its use of the term "or otherwise." It may be argued that this
phrase gave the indemnity clause in Lift an all-inclusive scope
which is noticeably absent in the instant case. The "or otherwise"
phrase in Lift would serve much the same purpose as the phrase
"of whatsoever kind or nature" present in Kurek. Both may be
seen as evidence of the intent of the contracting parties to grant indemnification under a wide variety of circumstances, including
instances where the indemnitee is actively negligent.
The Liff case may be further distinguished from the case at
bar in that the former contains the phrase "in part." It is reasonable to assume that one of the parties who is only partially at
fault could be the indemnitee. The inclusion of the phrase "in
part" may arguably have been designed to manifest the intent
of the parties to grant indemnification to the indemnitee even
when he was actively negligent.4 7 Thus, while the language in the
Lift case is not as explicit as other cases in which indemnification
for active negligence was granted,48 the phrase "in part" implies
that such was the intent of the parties.4 9 It is possible it was because
of this underlying implication, which demonstrates the intent of
the parties to grant indemnification despite active negligence,
rather than the contention that the language was sufficiently
unequivocal, that indemnification was granted in the Lift case. For
this reason, the Lift case may be inapplicable to the case at bar.
Leaving aside for a moment the fac that both the Kurek and
Lift cases may have been misconstrued, there remains to be considered the court's contention that the phrases "of whatsoever kind
or nature" and "or otherwise" contained in Kurek and Lift were insignificant differences without real meaning. 50 Several cases which
had indemnification clauses very similar to Kurek and Lift but
without the above quoted phrases have been held not to adequately
express the intent of the parties concerning indemnification for
active negligence. In Semanchuck v. Fifth Ave. & 37th St. Corp.,5
for example, the clause stated that the contractor would assume
47. Brief for Defendant-Respondent at 12, instant case.
48. Kurek v. Port Chester Housing Authority, 18 N.Y.2d 450, 228 N.E.2d 25, 276
N.Y.S.2d 612 (1966); Farrell v. General Tel. Co., 29 App. Div. 2d 51, 285 N.Y.S.2d 662 (3d
Dep't 1967); Yonke v. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 52 Misc. 2d 1039, 277 N.Y.S.2d
806 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd, 27 App. Div. 2d 888, 278 N.Y.S.2d 592 (3d Dep't 1967).
49. Brief for Defendant-Respondent at 12-13, instant case.
50. Instant case at 212,269 N.E.2d at 802, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
51. 290 N.Y. 412, 49 N.2d 507 (1943).
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"the obligation to save the Owner harmless and indemnify him
from.., liability.., by reason of any injury to any person... resulting from any action... under this contract."5 2 With the exception of
the phrase "of whatsoever kind or nature" present in Kurek, the
two indemnity clauses were very similar. Yet in Semanchuck
indemnification was denied. Furthermore, very similar indemnity
clauses, absent the all-inclusive language "of whatsoever kind or
nature" found in Kurek, were present in Rego v. City of New
York 53 and Batson-Cook Co. v. Industrial Steel ErectorsY4 In both
of these cases, indemnification was denied. The only apparent distinction between the Kurek and Liff cases and those cited above
was the inclusion in the former of the all-inclusive key phrases.
Yet in the case at bar these phrases were dismissed as "semantical
distinction[s] without a difference."' '
In interpreting the intent of the parties the courts must construe the contract so that it "should have not an arbitrary, that is,
an unduly liberal or harshly strict, construction, but a fair construction that will accomplish its stated purpose." ' As a result,
if any ambiguity or doubt does exist as to the intent, such doubt
must be resolved against the party drafting the contract17 -Shell in
the present case. In light of these considerations, it appears that the
court in the instant case did not construe the indemnity clause in
accordance with precedent. The phraseology of the Levine lease
52. Id. at 419, 49 N.E.2d at 509.
53. 285 App. Div. 834, 835, 137 N.Y.S.2d 5, 6 (2d Dep't 1955). In this case the con.
tractor agreed to:
be solely responsible for all physical injuries to persons or damage to property
occurring on account of the work hereunder, and shall indemnify and save harmless the City from loss and from liability upon any and all claims on account of
such injuries to person or damage to property.
54. 257 F.2d 410, 412 n.4 (5th Cir. 1958). The indemnity clause read:
Subcontractor assumes entire responsibility and liability for losses, expenses,
demands and claims in connection with or arising out of any injury, or alleged
injury (including death) to any person ... sustained in connection with or to have
arisen out of . . . the work by the Subcontractor, his subcontractors, agents,
servants and employees . . . and agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Contractor ... from any and all such losses ....
55. Instant case at 212, 269 N.E.2d at 802, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
56. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Thornton Bros. Co., 206 Minn. 193, 196, 288 N.V. 226, 227
(1939). Even the Levine court acknowledged that the unequivocal intent of the parties
was controlling when it stated: "[W]e see no reason why more should be required to
establish the unmistakable intent of the parties." Instant case at 212, 269 N.E.2d at 803,
321 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
57. Ratigan v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 181 F. Supp. 228 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 291 F.2d
548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 891 (1960); Fugate v. Greenberg: Publisher, 16 Misc.
2d 942, 189 N.Y.S.2d 948 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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appears to be as vague as that found in many of the previous cases
which were ruled to be too equivocal to include the active negligence of the indemnitee. The appellate division recognized this
when it said that the Levine lease "lacks the all-embracing language upon which an unmistakable intention to indemnify under
circumstances such as these can be spelled out."58
From the above it can be discerned that similar indemnity
clauses may be subject to disparate constructions. This naturally
results in a lack of predictability in the outcome of litigation in
this field. Although the unequivocal language requirement set
forth in Thompson-Starrett is no longer followed, it is still necessary that the intent of the parties be clearly established before indemnrification for active negligence is granted. In Kurek and Liff it
was held that the intent of the contracting parties was sufficiently
clear to justify indemnification despite the fact that the indemnity
clauses were less explicit than those previously held to be adequate.
The instant case, with an even more equivocal indemnity clause,
throws wide open the question of where to draw the line in finding
specific intent. It is feared that this case may have destroyed the last
vestige of predictability in the field of indemnification.5 9
The Court of Appeals in the instant case stated in a dictum
that the lease in question was not a contract of adhesion. The
court's argument was predicated on the belief that Visconti was
not forced to accept a lease containing any provisions to which he
objected,60 The court further maintained that if Visconti decided
to lease a service station from Shell, he should have bargained over
any of the terms he deemed unfair. This was possible, the court
reasoned, because there was here involved an "arm's length tiansaction." 0 '
58. Levine v. Shell Oil Co., 35 App. Div. 2d 575, 576, 318 N.Y.S.2d 581, 584 (2d
Dep't 1970).
59. Perhaps as an overreaction to this possibility a New York Supreme Court in
a subsequent case involving a service station lessee and Gulf Oil Corp. failed to find the
requisite clarity of intent in an indemnity clause that read
'Lesseb agrees to . . . protect and indemnify Lessor from any and all losses...
which may arise or grow out of any injury ...
caused by or in any manner connected.with-the use..-; ofsaid premises;.
"
Redding ,v. Gulf Oil Corp., - Misc. 2d -- 824" N.Y.S.2d 490, 491. (Sup. Ct. 1971). It is
interesting to note that the-court inthe Redding case, while quite strictly construing the
indemnity clause, maintained that it was guided by the principles set forth in the instant
case. Yet, in the instant case'i liberal interpretation of the indemnity clause, basdd on
the same principles, was made.
60. Instant case at 2l3.269\NE.2d tt803;,321N.Y.S.2d at 87.1
.
61. Id.
,_2z:N
" "!
.
..
". .
.
: .
..
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A contract of adhesion as generally recognized, has several
distinctive features. It consists of a standardized form signed by
parties of unequal bar'gaining power. The party enjoying the advantageous position uses the standard form to limit his future liability.62 It was said of indemnity agreements between major oil

companies and their service station operators in a recent case, that
"[t]hese agreements are standard forms used by the defendant
[Mobil Oil Co.] and common to the industry. "03
Another element in the definition of a contract of adhesion
is that it adversely affects the public good, one aspect of which is
public safety.6 4 It has been recognized that
A gasoline service station necessarily involves the storage and
sale to the public of gasoline and oil, whidh are so highly inflammable and explosive that they increase the danger of fire
and are, therefore, related to public safety. 5

Certainly it would be in the public interest to see that such
dangerous products are handled in the manner most likely to
to insure safety. The indemnity clause in a gas station lease
may produce the opposite result, as illustrated in the instant case.
Shell was aware that the gas heater was defective and that it had
been so for some time. However, Shell took no steps to repair it.
This eventually led to the serious injury of the plaintiffs.
Indemnity clauses, such as the one in the instant case, permit
the major oil companies to disclaim responsibility once the standard form lease is signed. Thus, even when such companies are
62. See TunkI v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963); Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of FundamentalBreach,
50 VA. L. REv. 1178 (1964). In such a contract the parties usually have greatly disparate
bargaining powers and this inequality of economic status tends to make one party vulnerable to an unfavorable bargain. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d
Cir. 1948). Obviously there would be a huge disparity of bargaining powers between
Shell Oil Co. and any individual seeking to lease a single service station. This alone
would serve to restrict Visconti's bargaining power and place him at a disadvantage.
63. Division of Triple T Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720, 722, 304
N.Y.S.2d 191, 194 (Sup. Ct. 1969). See also Redding v. Gulf Oil Corp., - Misc. 2d -,
324 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Sup. Ct. 1971). There it was said the service station lease was "a
printed form employed by the lessor [Gulfl in many similar transactions." Id. at -, 324
N.Y.S.2d at 491. It was also stated that "[t]he insertions are few and typewritten." It is
significant that the conditions of the lease were not among the insertions open for
negotiation.
64. See Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963).
65. People v. Faxlanger, 1 App. Div. 2d 92, 94, 147 N.Y.S.2d 595, 598 (4th Dep't
1955), aff'd, I N.Y.2d 393, 135 N.E.2d 705, 153 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1956).
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aware of situations inimical to the public well-being and have the
financial resources to remedy them, they are not bound to take any
affirmative action. Thus, the major oil companies may freely reap
all the financial benefits to be gained by the sale of their dangerous
products, while individual tenant-operators, who can least afford it,
must shoulder full financial responsibility for any accidents that
occur. In view of these considerations it appears that the Court of
Appeals acted less than prudently in dismissing so lightly the possibility of a contract of adhesion.
JAMES

D.

DONOVAN

